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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Ronald Anderson appeals from his judgment of conviction, claiming that several
incidents of prosecutorial misconduct during the closing arguments deprived him of his
state and federal constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial.

The State

concedes that there were two incidents of misconduct, but contends the remainder of
the offending statements constituted proper arguments on the evidence.

However,

those statements are still misconduct even though the prosecutor made other,
permissible arguments, because the prosecutor departed from the proper scope of
argument by improperly interjecting his personal beliefs and opinions about the
credibility of witnesses and disparaging the defense presented.

As the district court

indicated, the jury could have entertained reasonable doubts as to Mr. Anderson's guilt
based on the evidence presented, and therefore, the prejudice caused by each
individual instance of misconduct should cause this Court to vacate Mr. Anderson's
conviction. Certainly, the aggregation of all the incidents of misconduct would merit that
result in this case.
Additionally, upon filing his appeal, Mr. Anderson learned that the district court
failed to maintain a copy of the written post-proof jury instructions (Nos. 9 through 20)
provided to the jurors during their deliberations. As they constitute a necessary part of
the appellate record and may be the basis for appellate relief if they erroneously present
the law, either in the actual words or in the manner in which that information is
presented, the fact that those written instructions are unavailable for appellate review
violates Mr. Anderson's right to due process.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Anderson's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

2

ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court erred by failing to preserve the post-proof jury
instructions in the record, thus depriving Mr. Anderson of his right to due process.

2.

Whether Mr. Anderson's conviction should be vacated because of prosecutorial
misconduct by vouching for evidence, misstating the law, disparaging the
defense, and commenting on the veracity of Mr. Anderson's testimony.

3.

Whether the accumulation of errors in this case deprived Mr. Anderson of a fair
trial.

3

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred By Failing To PreseNe The Post-Proof Jury Instructions In The
Record, Thus Depriving Mr. Anderson Of His Right To Due Process

A.

Introduction
The district court's failure to preserve an adequate record for review violated

Mr. Anderson's constitutional right to due process by depriving him of a fundamentally
fair appellate proceeding.

The written jury instructions are a necessary part of the

appellate record. They may be challenged on appeal, both for content (the actual words
used) and for presentation (the manner in which those words are laid out). An error in
either regard may justify appellate relief.

As such, because there is a reasonable

possibility the jurors could have relied on the erroneous written instructions which are
taken into deliberations rather than their memories of the oral instructions, a transcript of
the oral recitation of those instructions is insufficient to cure this error.

Because the

written instructions are not available for Mr. Anderson's review and challenge, he has
been deprived of his constitutional right to due process. As such, this Court should
vacate his conviction.

B.

By Not Preserving A Sufficient Record For Appeal, The District Court Violated
Mr. Anderson's Due Process Rights
The State concedes that the post-proof instructions are missing and are not

able to be located. (Resp. Br., p.11 n.6.) As such, it concedes the error, and focuses
its response on whether or not Mr. Anderson was prejudiced by that error. (See Resp.
Br., pp.11-16.) It is wrong inasmuch as it contends Mr. Anderson was not prejudiced;

4

the failure to preserve a written copy of the post-proof instructions did prejudice
Mr. Anderson.
The point of the due process protections in regard to the record on appellate
review is to allow the defendant an adequate opportunity to review the proceedings
below for error.

Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 498 (1963) ("What [is]

impermissible [is] the total denial to petitioners of any means of getting adequate review
on the merits [of their claims]."). The district court's failure to preserve the record for
review violates the defendant's right to due process by depriving the proceedings of
the necessary fundamental fairness. 1 See, e.g., State v. Zielinski, 119 Idaho 316, 318
(1991); State v. Martinez, 92 Idaho 148, 149-50 (1968); Ebersole v. State, 91 Idaho
630, 636 (1967).

This right guarantees that the defendant will be provided with "a

record on appeal that is sufficient for adequate review of the errors alleged regarding
the proceedings below." State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621 (Ct. App. 2012) (quoting
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462 (2002).)

Historically, the written instructions have been considered "an essential part of
the record on appeal." State v. Upham, 52 Idaho 340, _ , 14 P.2d 1101, 1102 (1932).
The reason is "[t]he written instructions, or a copy thereof, shall be given to each juror to
take when the jury retires for deliberation." I.C.R. 30(b) (emphasis added).

Therefore,

since the written instructions are what the jurors would presumably have relied on if they
had questions in regard to the governing law during their deliberations, the written
instructions need to be included in the appellate record for review.

As such, their

absence deprived Mr. Anderson of an adequate appellate record, thereby prejudicing

1

U.S. CONST. amend. VI, XIV; IDAHO CONST., art. I§ 13.
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him - he was not afforded any opportunity to review that necessary part of the record
for error.
In this case, Mr. Anderson appealed, challenging his judgment of conviction.
(R., p.85.)

In the Appellant's Brief, Mr. Anderson articulated two ways in which

the jury instructions may have been erroneous - they may misstate the law or they may
differ from the oral instructions. (See App. Br., pp.15-16.) Therefore, when the record
necessary for review of those contentions is not available,
but had a record been available [that] might have substantiated the
defendant's allegation that there was prejudicial error in those
proceedings, a judgment of conviction based upon [those] proceedings
cannot be sustained; otherwise the defendant has been denied due
process in violation of the Constitution of the United States and of the
State of Idaho.

State v. Walters, 120 Idaho 46, 51 (1990) (quoting State v. Wright, 97 Idaho 229, 23536 (1975), Bakes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)).

Thus, the absence of these

necessary instructions, which might have substantiated such allegations means that
Mr. Anderson was prejudiced and his constitutional rights violated by the failure to
maintain copies of the written instructions.
Specifically, the written jury instructions can be challenged in a few different
ways.

They may improperly state the law, or they may present the instructions

erroneously.

See State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 589-92 (2011).

In Draper, the

defendant challenged the manner in which the instruction presented the law, in that the
defendant-appellant was challenging the way in which the instruction listed the elements
of the offense. See id.

He was not challenging the phrasing, the actual words used,

and there was no indication that the particular section in question was not a correct

6

statement of the law. 2 See id. Rather, the asserted error was that one of the elements
of the offense was mislabeled, appearing instead as one of several potential overt acts,
as opposed to a separate element. See id. The Idaho Supreme Court took pains to
note that the district court had attempted to correct that error by interlineation. Id. at 590
n.3, 591.

Nevertheless, even with that correction in place, the Idaho Supreme Court

found that there was no way to know how the jury had viewed that written instruction.
Id. at 590-91. Therefore, since the jury could have misread the instruction based on the

erroneous presentation of the law, even though the actual language of the instruction
was correct, the Idaho Supreme Court found the instruction to be erroneous. Id. at 591.
As a result of that error in the presentation of the instruction, the Idaho Supreme Court
vacated the judgment of conviction. Id. at 591-92.
Furthermore, the oral instruction does not necessarily cure an error with the
written instruction.

See, e.g., State v. Amelia, 144 Idaho 332 (Ct. App. 2007).

In

Amelia, the jury was orally instructed by the district court prior to counsel's closing

statements. Id. at 336. There is no indication that the oral instruction was an incorrect
statement of the law. See generally id. However, when the jury retired to deliberate,
it was given a written instruction which was different than the oral instruction.

Id. at

334-35. The written instruction was a correct statement of the law. Id. Nevertheless,
even though the jury had received correct statements of the law, the Court of Appeals
vacated the conviction because of the prejudice caused by the difference between the

2

In fact, the language describing a charge of conspiracy is the same as used in the
form jury instruction. Compare Draper, 151 Idaho at 589-90, with ICJI 1101.
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oral and written instructions. Id. at 336. As such, a transcript of the oral instruction
does not cure the absence of the written instructions from the record. See id.
In this case, since the instructions are missing from the district court's file,
Mr. Anderson cannot compare them with the oral recitation to see if there is an
Amelia-type error in his case.

Additionally, the oral recitation does not delineate

between the different instructions, much less between any subdivisions therein. 3
(See generally Tr., Vol.1, p.84, L.8 - p.90, L.25.)

As such, the prejudice caused to

Mr. Anderson is evident, even without a specific articulation as to an error within those
instructions (i.e., the abstract prejudice) which, according to the Idaho Supreme Court
may (though not always) rise to constitutional dimensions. Walters, 120 Idaho at 49;
Wright, 97 Idaho at 231.

In this case, that abstract prejudice does rise to constitutional dimensions. For
example, even if Mr. Anderson could articulate a specific error in the instructions based
on the incomplete record provided him, "without a copy of the proposed jury instruction
this Court would be without sufficient information to evaluate [the propriety of the
instruction]." State v. Walsh, 141 Idaho 870, 877 (Ct. App. 2005). Therefore, without
the written instructions, there would be insufficient information to evaluate the propriety
of the written instructions. See id.; compare Draper, 151 Idaho at 589-92. Therefore,
even if Mr. Anderson were to assert some particular error in the written instructions, the
absence of a copy of the written instructions in the record means his challenge could

The successful challenge in Draper hinged on the way in which the written instruction
was subdivided within the instruction. Draper, 151 Idaho at 589-92. As such, without
the written instructions, Mr. Anderson is deprived of the ability to review for such errors
by the district court's failure to maintain its record.
3
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not be successful, even if he were correct as to the error itself.

See, e.g.,

State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that, where a pertinent portion

of the record is missing, it is presumed to support the actions of the trial court). As a
result, Mr. Anderson has been deprived of the ability to conduct an adequate review of
the record in his case and raise the viable issues possibly supported therein, which is a
deprivation of the constitutional right to due process.
Ultimately, it amounts to a deprivation of Mr. Anderson's opportunity to make
such challenges. '"When a person ... [is] deprived, through no fault of his own, of the
opportunity of affirmatively establishing facts to demonstrate the legality or illegality of
his incarceration, a fundamental lack of fairness in the judicial process is established."'
Walters, 120 Idaho at 51 (quoting Martinez, 92 Idaho at 149-50) (emphasis in italics

from Walters, emphasis in bold added); see also Ebersole, 91 Idaho at 636. Thus, it is
the deprivation of the opportunity to challenge the instructions, not, as the State seems
to believe, a specific impropriety in the instructions themselves, 4 which constitutes the

In fact, the State demands Mr. Anderson articulate a particular challenge to one of the
post-proof instructions. (See Resp. Br., p.13 ("[Mr. Anderson] has failed to identify
specifically what it is about the missing written jury instruction that he wishes
to challenge . . . . ").) This takes a far too narrow view of the argument regarding
prejudice. As the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed in Walters, it is the deprivation of the
opportunity to make such challenges that violates due process. Walters, 120 Idaho at
51. The State would create a circular standard, where, in order to assert a due process
challenge due to the absence of a necessary document from the record, the appellant
would have to know not only the contents of that document, but the error contained
therein, all without ever having seen the document. Additionally, the appellant would
have to convince the appellate court of that error without being afforded the opportunity
to present evidence in support of that assertion. As the Court of Appeals pointed out in
Walsh, when that is the case, the appellant fails to meet its burden of proof and will
lose. See Walsh, 141 Idaho at 877. As such, the State's proposed standard would
effectively deprive an appellant of any review of his case, which, as the Idaho Supreme
Court has recognized, deprives the proceedings of fundamental fairness. Walters, 120
Idaho at 51 (quoting Martinez, 92 Idaho at 149-50).
4
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violation of Mr. Anderson's constitutional rights in this case.

That is the "abstract

prejudice" discussed in Walters, and since fundamental fairness, absent in this case, is
required by the constitutional protection of due process, that abstract prejudice does
rise to the constitutional dimension. See Walters, 120 Idaho at 49-51.
Therefore, because the district court failed to maintain a copy of an adequate
record for review by failing to maintain a copy of the written post-proof jury instructions,
Mr. Anderson was prejudiced, as he was deprived of the opportunity to adequately
review and challenge his judgment of conviction in violation of his constitutional right to
due process. As such, this Court should vacate his conviction.

11.
Mr. Anderson's Conviction Should Be Vacated Because Of Prosecutorial Misconduct
By Vouching For Evidence, Misstating The Law, Disparaging The Defense, And
Commenting On The Veracity Of Mr. Anderson's Testimony

A

Introduction
Mr. Anderson contends that several statements made by the prosecutor during

closing arguments constitute misconduct. Given the nature of the evidence in this case
(which, according to even the district court, is not at all overwhelming), there is a
reasonable possibility that those comments impacted the jury's decision, thereby
prejudicing Mr. Anderson. As a result, this Court should vacate Mr. Anderson's
conviction because those comments deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial.
As there were no contemporaneous objections to the prosecutor's comments,

10

Mr. Anderson has raised these claims as fundamental error pursuant to State v. Perry,
150 Idaho 209 (2010). 5

The State concedes that two of those statements, one vouching for the evidence
the State presented and the other disparaging the defense, were erroneous. Given the
state of the evidence presented, each individual instance of misconduct prejudiced
Mr. Anderson and justifies granting him relief.

The aggregation of those statements,

constituting multiple types of misconduct, definitely prejudiced Mr. Anderson, in that
there is a reasonable possibility that the combination of those inappropriate comments
impacted the outcome of the trial. As such, each of those two statements constitutes
fundamental error, and the State has not argued that those errors were harmless.
Therefore,

based

on

those two statements alone, this

Court should vacate

Mr. Anderson's conviction.
In regard to the other statements identified by Mr. Anderson, the State contends
that they were proper comments on the evidence. Those statements, however, depart
from the scope of proper argument because the prosecutor interjected his personal
opinions and beliefs as to the reliability of witnesses and the defense presented; he did
not state reasonable inferences based on the evidence itself. Therefore, those other
comments do, in fact, constitute misconduct.

They also implicate Mr. Anderson's

constitutional rights and prejudiced him. Each comment, therefore, individually justifies

an order vacating the conviction.

Furthermore, as each additional incident of

misconduct is considered, the aggregated prejudice becomes more obvious. As such,

To raise a claim under fundamental error, the defendant must show that (1) one of his
unwaived constitutional rights was violated, (2) the error was clear on the record, and
(3) the defendant was prejudiced by the error. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228.
5
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because of the multiple incidents of prosecutorial misconduct, this Court should vacate
Mr. Anderson's conviction.

B.

There Is A Reasonable Possibility That The Two Incidents Of Misconduct Which
The State Concedes Occurred Impacted The Jury's Determination, Thereby
Depriving Mr. Anderson Of His Constitutional Right To Due Process And A Fair
Trial

1.

The Prosecutor's Comment Vouching For The State's
Constituted Fundamental Error And It Alone Justifies Relief

Evidence

The State concedes that the prosecutor committed misconduct by telling the jury
"I was a criminal defense attorney for 15 years. I've been a prosecutor for four years,
and this in my -- this is some of the best evidence I've presented." (Resp. Br., p.26
(quoting Tr., Vol.1, p.120, Ls.13-16).) It contends, however, that this statement did not
infringe on Mr. Anderson's constitutional rights. (Resp. Br., pp.26-27.) That is wrong,
since, as Idaho's appellate courts have explained, when the prosecutor attempts to
secure a verdict on factors other than the evidence presented, such as by placing the
imprimatur of the State behind the evidence, the defendant's constitutional right to a fair
trial is violated. 6 Perry, 150 Idaho at 227; State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 368-69
(Ct. App. 2010).

Specifically in regard to vouching, the Ninth Circuit has put it best:

"When credibility of witnesses is crucial, improper vouching is parlicularly likely to
jeopardize the fundamental fairness of the trial." 7 United States v. Edwards, 154 F.3d

The right to a fair trial is guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions as a
matter of due process. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, XIV; IDAHO CONST., art. I§ 13.
7 Given that the sequence of events in this case is highly disputed, specifically, whether
Ms. Morrison invited Mr. Anderson to visit her trailer and whether the sexual intercourse
was consensual (see App. Br., pp.2-9), this is the type of case where the testimony of
witnesses is crucial. The case turns on which witnesses the jury believes. Therefore,
this comment, which the State concedes is inappropriate vouching, infringed on
6

12

915, 921 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added).

The Idaho Court of Appeals agrees,

recognizing that "[a] prosecutor can improperly vouch for a witness by placing the
prestige of the State behind the witness .... " Wheeler, 149 Idaho at 368-69.

As

such, this statement, which has been conceded, is misconduct, violated one of
Mr. Anderson's unwaived constitutional rights by depriving him of a fair trial.

See

Wheeler, 149 Idaho at 368-69; Edwards, 154 F.3d at 921. As such, the first prong of
the Perry analysis is satisfied.
The prosecutor's statement transcribed verbatim, as well as the error therein, are
also clear from the record. The fact that the State has conceded error indicates that.
Thus, the only question remaining under Perry is whether the comment
prejudiced Mr. Anderson. To show prejudice arising from prosecutorial misconduct, the
defendant must demonstrate that there "is a reasonable possibility that the error
affected the outcome of the trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.

This standard does not

require the defendant to show that the outcome would have been different, only that
there is a reasonable chance that the verdict was impacted by the misconduct in some
manner.

See, e.g., State v. Day, _

P.3d _ , 2013 Opinion No.6, p.8 (Ct. App.

January 24, 2013) (not yet final; pet. for review pending). In such situations '"[w]here
the issue of guilt is debatable or it appears from the record that the jurors could have
reasonably entertained doubt as to the defendant's guilt and that misconduct of the
prosecuting attorney might well have influenced the result, a conviction will be

Mr. Anderson's constitutional right to a fair trial.
368-69; Edwards, 154 F.3d at 921.
13

See, e.g., Wheeler, 149 Idaho at

reversed."' State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 111 (1979) (quoting State v. Spencer, 74
Idaho 173, 184 (1953)). 8
Additionally, prosecutors are held to a high standard to avoid misconduct
because when they engage in misconduct, the chances for prejudice are higher.
See, e.g., United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985); State v. Carson, 151 Idaho
713, 721 (2011). "[S]uch comments can ... jeopardize the defendant's right to be tried
solely on the basis of the evidence presented to the jury; and the prosecutor's opinion
carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the
Government's judgment rather than its own view of the evidence." Carson, 151 Idaho at
1 (quoting Young, 470 U.S. at 18-19). Therefore, Idaho has long held:
the limits on permissible closing argument apply most stringently to a
prosecuting attorney.... 'The desire for success should never induce him
to endeavor to obtain a verdict by arguments based on anything except
the evidence in the case, and the conclusions legitimately deducible from
the law applicable to the same .... It seems that [prosecutors] frequently
exert their skill and ingenuity to see how far they can trespass upon the
verge of error, and generally, in so doing they transgress on the rights of
the accused.'
State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35,
43-44 (1903)) (emphasis added).

Therefore, since the chance of prejudice is higher

when the prosecutor is committing the misconduct, the possibility that the jury was
improperly influenced by the prosecutor's erroneous comment is more reasonable, and
thus, the misconduct is more likely to constitute fundamental error.

While Garcia and Spencer predate Perry's reformation of the fundamental error
doctrine, their rationale is still valid. Compare Day,_ P.3d _ , 2013 Opinion No.6,
p.8 (not yet final). It demonstrates how a defendant is prejudiced by prosecutorial
misconduct.
8
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In this case, the district court pointed out that the evidence against Mr. Anderson
was not overwhelming, but that it contradicted Ms. Morrison's testimony in several
ways, then concluded: "I probably would have gone the other way [found not guilty]; but
I mean, there was -- I have to say I was shocked by this verdict." (See Tr., Vol.1, p.142,
L.16 - p.146, L.2.) Given that the evidence in this case was not overwhelming, it is not
possible to say that there is no reasonable possibility that the erroneous statements had
an impact on the verdict. The jury could have easily entertained reasonable doubts as
to Mr. Anderson's guilt in regard, for example, to the issues with the evidence
highlighted by the district court. As a result, there is a reasonable possibility that its
decision to convict was influenced by the prosecutor's improper vouching.

As such,

Mr. Anderson was prejudiced by the prosecutor's vouching for the evidence. See Perry,
150 Idaho at 226; Garcia, 100 Idaho at 111; Day, 2013 Opinion No.6, p.8. Therefore,
this statement, where the prosecutor invoked his experience in order to vouch for the
State's evidence, telling the jury that "this is the best evidence I've presented,"
constitutes fundamental error.
Once misconduct is shown to be fundamental error, relief should be granted
unless the State proves that the misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 716 (2009). The State has offered no argument in
regard to harmlessness. 9 (See generally Resp. Br.) The failure to provide argument or
authority constitutes a waiver of that argument.

State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263

(1996); see also State v. Almaraz,_ P.3d _ , 2013 Opinion No.41, pp.16-17 (April 1,

9

Mr. Anderson contends that, given the underwhelming nature of the evidence
presented (see Tr., Vol.1, p.142, L.16 - p.146, L.2), the same evidence demonstrating
prejudice also shows that the misconduct was not harmless.
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2013) (not yet final; pet. for rehearing pending) (holding that, where the State fails to
specifically argue harmlessness, it fails to meet its burden in this regard). Therefore,
because there was fundamental error caused by the prosecutor's improper statement
vouching for the evidence, this Court should vacate Mr. Anderson's conviction.

2.

The Prosecutor's Comment Disparaging Defense Counsel Constituted
Fundamental Error And It Alone Justifies Relief

The State also concedes that the prosecutor committed misconduct by
disparaging defense counsel, telling the jury that he did not refer to Mr. Anderson's
testimony during his closing because he "knows it's not a good story." (Resp. Br., p.27
(quoting Tr., Vol.1, p.120, L.19 - p.121 L.6).) The State contends, however, that this
comment does not implicate the first or second prongs of Perry. (Resp. Br., p.28.) For
example, it argues the error in this statement was not clear on the record because it
was not evident from those statements that the prosecutor was indicating that defense
counsel elicited false testimony.

(R., pp.27-28.)

However, these sort of comments,

which disparage defense counsel and the defense presented, do constitute fundamental
error because they are designed to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jurors. 10

The ultimate question in this regard is whether the statements had the effect of
disparaging defense counsel. The intent to disparage need not be express, or even
strictly present. See State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 576 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Urgings,
explicit or implied, for the jury to render a verdict based on factors other than the
evidence admitted at trial ... have no place in closing argument."); State v. Baruth, 107
Idaho 657 (Ct. App. 1984) ("These statements had the effect-if not the intent-to
disparage Baruth's attorney. . . . [W]e believe these statements were improper.").
Therefore, if the result of a statement is that the reasonable juror could possibly have
been influenced to decide the case based on the erroneous comment, rather than
deciding the case on the evidence presented, the error is clear - such a comment
constitutes misconduct. As such, the only question remaining is whether the defendant
is entitled to appellate relief (i.e., whether the comments prejudiced the defendant).
Baruth, 107 Idaho at 657.
10
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State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 266 (Ct. App. 201 O); State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 21
(Ct. App. 2008). And disparaging opposing counsel is one way in which the prosecutor
improperly inflames the jurors' passions and prejudices.

Gross, 146 Idaho at 20-21;

see also State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 223 (2000); Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86.

The

prosecutor can also commit this kind of misconduct by disparaging or mischaracterizing
the defense presented. Beebe, 145 Idaho at 576.
In this case, the error in the prosecutor's statement in this regard is clear, as he
appealed to the prejudices of the jury by disparaging the defense presented, as well as
the defense attorney's decisions in presenting that case:
I found it interesting, too, that [defense counsel] in his closing he hardly
even mentioned Mr. Anderson's testimony. There was only one or two
references to when he testified about his story. I find that interesting. I
mean, all he did was argue to you that the police didn't do a good job. He
never -- he never talked to you about his client's version of events except
one or two times. Why? Because it's an unbelievable story. And it's
uncredible, and it doesn't look good to stand up there and talk about his
client's story, because he knows -- I would submit to you the reason is is
[sic] because he knows it's not a good story.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.120, L.19 - p.121, L.6.)

And while the prosecutor is able to point out

weaknesses in the defenses case, "this can be done in many ways without attacking the
defendant's counsel."

Baruth, 107 Idaho at 657.

Therefore, those comments, even

though they were made alongside permissible arguments, are still erroneous.
Furthermore, they constitute fundamental error because they were calculated to
arouse the passions against the defense.

See State v. Timmons, 145 Idaho 279,

287 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 715 (Ct. App. 2003); see also

Beebe, 145 Idaho at 576; Baruth, 107 Idaho at 657. Those statements infringed on
Mr. Anderson's constitutional right to a fair trial because a reasonable jury may have
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taken the prosecutor's comments to mean it should be frustrated with the defense for, at
least, wasting its time with an unbelievable story, or, at worst, presenting false evidence
in an "uncredible" story. Either way, the prosecutor's comments call into question the
fairness of the trial. See id. Such statements can also constitute fundamental error if
they are so inflammatory that the jury "may be influenced to determine guilt on factors
outside the evidence." 11

Id.

As explained in Section 11(8)(1 ), supra, because the

evidence was not overwhelming, there is a reasonable possibility that the jury
entertained a reasonable doubt about Mr. Anderson's guilt and may well have been
influenced in its decision by this improper statement.

Therefore, this statement, by

itself, constitutes fundamental and prejudicial error, and should result in vacating the
conviction, since the State has not argued that this error was harmless. See Perry, 150
Idaho at 226; Garcia, 100 Idaho at 111; Day, 2013 Opinion No.6, p.8.

3.

The Two Errors Conceded By The State, When Aggregated, Are Sufficient
To Demonstrate Cumulative Error

Even if this Court determines that the two points of conceded error are ultimately
harmless by themselves, together, they show that Mr. Anderson was not afforded his
constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial and, as such, his conviction should be
vacated.

State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453 (1994); State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho

629, 635 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Vandenacre, 131 Idaho 507, 513 (Ct. App. 1998).
Since the State has conceded two incidents of error, the cumulative error doctrine
applies in this case. Compare, e.g., State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 500 (Ct. App.

11

As with the analysis on the prejudice prong of Perry, Mr. Anderson does not need to
prove that the jury was influenced in this manner, only that there is a reasonable chance
that it was. See Day,_ P.3d _ , 2013 Opinion No.6, p.8 (not yet final).
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2008) (not reaching the cumulative error question because the court found that the
defendant had not shown more than one error). It is not the presence of multiple errors,
themselves, that justify relief, but the prejudice arising from that combination of errors.
State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823 (1998). Since there is more likely to be prejudice

when the prosecutor commits misconduct, Young, 470 U.S. at 18-19; Carson, 151
Idaho at 721; Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87, there is a reasonable possibility that the jury's
decision was impacted by the multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct.
Furthermore,

as the

district court

pointed

out,

the

evidence was

not

overwhelming (see Tr., Vol.1, p.142, L.16 - p.146, L.2), and as a result, there is a
reasonable possibility that the jury had reasonable doubts about Mr. Anderson's guilt
which were set aside because of the prosecutor's multiple improper statements.
Therefore, this Court should vacate Mr. Anderson's conviction, which was obtained
without affording him his state and federal constitutional rights to due process and a fair
trial. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226; Garcia, 100 Idaho at 111; Day, 2013 Opinion No.6,
p.8.

C.

The Other Comments Also Constitute Prosecutorial Misconduct, As They Depart
From The Proper Scope Of Comments On The Evidence To Inappropriately
Interject The Prosecutor's Personal Beliefs Regarding The Evidence, Thereby
Depriving Mr. Anderson Of His Constitutional Right To Due Process And A Fair
Trial
The remaining statements of which Mr. Anderson complains do constitute

prosecutorial misconduct, contrary to the State's contentions. (See App. Br., pp.20-26;
Resp. Br., pp.18-26.) The State asserts that these comments were proper arguments
based on the evidence. (Resp. Br., pp.18-26.) However, while these comments may
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have been made alongside proper comments on the evidence, they were not
themselves proper.
Closing argument should not include counsel's personal opinions and
beliefs about the credibility of a witness or the guilt or innocence of the
accused. A prosecuting attorney may express an opinion in argument as
to the truth or falsity of testimony or the guilt of the defendant when such
opinion is based on the evidence, but the prosecutor should exercise
caution to avoid interjecting his or her own personal belief and should
explicitly state that the opinion is based solely on inferences from
evidence presented at trial.
State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 369 (Ct. App. 2010) (emphasis added). As such,
while a prosecutor is allowed to make arguments arising from reasonable inferences
from the evidence, when he interjects assertions of his own beliefs and opinions,
throwing the imprimatur of the State behind the evidence in doing so, he is no longer
making permissible argument; he is committing misconduct which undermines the
defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.

Young, 470 U.S. at 18-19; Carson, 151

Idaho at 721, Wheeler, 149 Idaho at 369; compare Baruth, 107 Idaho at 657 (finding
misconduct when the prosecutor departed from permissible comments and disparaged
opposing counsel).
Most of the comments identified in the Appellant's Brief contain this type of flaw:
the prosecutor may have made some permissible comments on certain topics, but
departed from the permissible scope of argument to interject expressions of his own
opinion, throwing his credibility, and thereby, the imprimatur of the State, (sometimes
overtly, as discussed in Section 11(8)(1 ), supra) behind the evidence. In doing so, the
prosecutor committed misconduct and violated Mr. Anderson's state and federal
constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial, even though he had also made
permissible argument on those same topics.
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By Vouching For The Credibility Of The State's Witnesses And The
State's Evidence, The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct

1.

The most obvious of the remaining comments which constitutes misconduct was
the prosecutor's vouching by expressly stating his opinion regarding the credibility of the
nurse practitioner:

"I thought the nurse practitioner was very credible."

Br., p.21 (quoting Tr., Vol.1, p.69, L.25 - p.97, L.1 ).)

(See App.

This is a textbook example of

vouching, as "[c]losing argument should not include counsel's personal opinions and
beliefs about the credibility of a witness . . . . "

Wheeler, 149 Idaho at 369.

Such

comments "jeopardize the defendant's right to be tried solely on the basis of the
evidence presented to the jury; and the prosecutor's opinion carries with it the
imprimatur of the Government and may induce the Government's judgment rather than
its own view of the evidence."' Carson, 151 Idaho at 721 (quoting Young, 470 U.S. at
18-19)

Therefore, even though the prosecutor went on, as the State points out, to

make permissible comments in regard to the consistency of that witness's testimony
with that of other witnesses (see Resp. Br., p.20), the initial comment is, nonetheless,
improper vouching.

Compare Baruth, 107 Idaho at 657 ("A prosecutor has every

legitimate right to point out weaknesses in the defendant's case, but this can be done in
many ways without [engaging in misconduct]," and concluding that when the prosecutor
does depart from proper argument in this manner, the statements do constitute
misconduct).
In this situation, the prosecutor could have legitimately made all the other points
about the consistency of the nurse practitioner's testimony with the physical evidence.
(See Tr., Vol.1, p.97, Ls.2-21.) The error occurred when the prosecutor departed from

those comments on the evidence and interjected his own personal comment as to that
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witness's credibility:

"I thought the nurse practitioner was very credible." (Tr., Vol.1,

p.96, L.25 - p.97, L.1.) That statement is not a proper comment on the evidence; it is,
according to Idaho Supreme Court precedent, misconduct. Wheeler, 149 Idaho at 369.
Since this type of misconduct has been identified as directly infringing on the
constitutional right to a fair trial, see Young, 470 U.S. at 18-19; Carson, 151 Idaho at
721, the first prong of Perry is satisfied. As the error is obvious on the record, as it is a
direct statement, transcribed verbatim, vouching for the witness's credibility, the second
prong of the Perry analysis is also satisfied. For the same reasons discussed in Section
11(8), supra, there is a reasonable possibility that this comment impacted the jury's

decision, thereby prejudicing Mr. Anderson.

As such, that statement constitutes

fundamental error, and, as there is no proof beyond a reasonable doubt that this error is
harmless (nor has the State advanced an argument in that regard), this Court should
vacate Mr. Anderson's conviction as a result of that misconduct. See Perry, 150 Idaho
at 226; Garcia, 100 Idaho at 111; Day, 2013 Opinion No.6, p.8.
There was also a third incident of vouching that is clear on the record.

The

prosecutor told the jury, "I mean, my gosh, this is great evidence." (Tr., Vol.1, p.123,
Ls. 7-8.) That comment is not based on the evidence; it is the prosecutor's personal
opinion. While this statement is not very explicit in its vouching for the evidence, even
implied vouching is sufficient to demonstrate misconduct.

See Beebe, 145 Idaho at

576. As such, the prosecutor departed from permissible argument and interjected his
own opinion about the credibility of the State's evidence, and constitutes clear
misconduct.

Therefore, for the same reasons the statement vouching for the nurse
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practitioner justifies relief, this incident of misconduct should also result in an order
vacating Mr. Anderson's conviction.

2.

By Disparaging the Defense And Its Theory Of The Case, The Prosecutor
Committed Misconduct, Justifying Vacating Mr. Anderson's Conviction

The prosecutor also made several other comments which departed from
permissible argument and disparaged the defense presented. 12 These comments are
just as improper as the concededly erroneous comments discussed in Section 11(8)(2).
Just as the prosecutor is not allowed to disparage opposing counsel, he is not allowed
to disparage or mischaracterize the defense presented. See Beebe, 145 Idaho at 576;

see also Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87. That is exactly what these statements did, appealing
to the passions and prejudices of the jury, resulting in the reasonable possibility, given
the underwhelming nature of the evidence presented, that those comments impacted
the verdict in this case, causing the jury to ignore the reasonable doubts they had and
convict on information beyond the scope of the evidence. (See Section 1(8)(2), supra.)
Therefore, for the same reasons discussed in Section 11(8)(2), these statements also
individually justify relief in this case, as they constitute fundamental error, and were not

12

"[T]he defense -- they want to come up with stories how they [Ms. Morrison's injuries]

happened some way else -- happened some other way . ... And they come up with
these stories that are not believable, but yet they throw them out to you and want you to
believe them." (Tr., Vol.1, p.123, Ls.2-7.) "So to bring this out -- again, when you don't
have a good story to tell, and Mr. Anderson has had a long time to come up with a good
story, and that was a terrible story.
I'm surprised he didn't come up with anything
better." (Tr., Vol.1, p.118, Ls.19-23.) "That's a ridiculous argument. But, again, you've
got to come up with something." (Tr., Vol.1, p.121, Ls.17-25.) "You know, when the
defense doesn't have -- when they have a defendant that comes up with an
unbelievable story they've got to use smoke and mirrors." (Tr., Vol.1, p.117, Ls.7-10.)
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harmless (nor has the State made any argument in that regard). Therefore, this Court
should vacate Mr. Anderson's conviction.

3.

By Misstating The Law In Regard To The Burden Of Proof, The
Prosecutor
Committed
Misconduct
Which
Justifies
Vacating
Mr. Anderson's Conviction

Finally, the

prosecutor made several statements which

suggested that

Mr. Anderson had a responsibility to present evidence in his defense, (i.e., that he
had a responsibility to disprove the State's evidence). 13 The State's primary contention
is that these were proper comments arising from the nature of Mr. Anderson's
testimony. (Resp. Br., pp.24-25.) While the prosecutor is permitted to make comments
regarding the truth or falsity of the defendant's testimony, those comments must arise
from the evidence itself. See, e.g., Wheeler, 149 Idaho at 369. The prosecutor is not
permitted to depart from the evidence and make comments which indicate that the
defendant has a responsibility to present evidence. See, e.g., State v. Adamcik, 152
Idaho 445, 482 (2012) (finding no error in the prosecution's statements which did not
make such an indication). A defendant is not required, nor does he have a
responsibility, to present any evidence at trial. Cf Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605,
609-10 ( 1972) (holding a defendant need not disclose whether he intends to testify or
offer defense witnesses before trial because he cannot be sure until after the State has
presented its evidence whether such testimony will be necessary or helpful to his case);
State v. Mendoza, 151 Idaho 623, 627 (Ct. App. 2011) (holding that neither direct nor

13

Specifically, "[a]nd you've got to come up with something. If you're the defense, what
do you do? You've got to attack. You can't just sit back and say nothing. You've got to
come up with some story.... [t]hat's a ridiculous argument. But, again, you've got to
come up with something." (Tr., Vol.1, p.120, 16-19; Tr., Vol.1, p.121, Ls.17-25.)
24

indirect comments on the defendant's failure to present evidence through his own
testimony are permissible).
In order to determine whether the prosecutor has departed from permissible
argument "requires careful attention to the words actually spoken to the jury. Whether
a defendant has been accorded his constitutional rights depends upon the way in
which a reasonable jury could have interpreted the instruction [regarding the burden
of proof]." State v. Mubita, 145 Idaho 925, 942 (2008); abrogated on other grounds by

Verksa v. St. Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 895-96 (2011). Therefore, the
prosecutor commits misconduct in that regard if he makes statements which "diminish[]
or distort[]" the burden of proof. 14
2010).

State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 685 (Ct. App.

Again, the question here is whether a reasonable jury could interpret the

statements in this fashion. See Baruth, 107 Idaho at 657 ("These statements had the
effect-if not the intent-to disparage Baruth's attorney. . . .

[W]e believe these

statements were improper."); see also Beebe, 145 Idaho at 576. As such, the State's
contention that the prosecutor had a legitimate intent behind those comments is
unavailing. (See Resp. Br., pp.24-25.)
A reasonable jury could interpret the statement "[you have] got to come up with
something," in accordance with the definition of the term "have" in this context, which
means "to be compelled or forced." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS,

373 (2007). As such, the prosecutor's statement indicates the defendant was forced to
present evidence in his defense, which is an incorrect statement of law.

14

Those

The Court of Appeals went on to find that this misconduct constituted fundamental
error under a pre-Perry standard. Erickson, 148 Idaho at 685.
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comments constitute misconduct, and since there is a reasonable possibility, given the
underwhelming nature of the evidence in this case, that the jury would convict because
Mr. Anderson failed to disprove the State's case, rather than holding the State to its
burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, they prejudiced Mr. Anderson. See
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226; Garcia, 100 Idaho at 111; Day, 2013 Opinion No.6, p.8 (not yet

final).

As a result, these comments are not harmless (nor has the State made an

argument in that regard). Therefore, these comments each justify relief. As such, this
Court should vacate Mr. Anderson's conviction.

111.
The Accumulation Of Errors In This Case Deprived Mr. Anderson Of A Fair Trial
Even if this Court determines that each of the prosecutor's improper comments is
harmless in and of itself, the aggregation of improper comments by the prosecutor,
including the two conceded to be error by the State, show that Mr. Anderson was not
afforded his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial. See Martinez, 125 Idaho
at 453; Paciorek, 137 Idaho at 635; Vandenacre, 131 Idaho at 513. Since, in this case,
the issue of guilt is debatable and, based on the record, the jury could have entertained
reasonable doubt as to Mr. Anderson's guilt (see Tr., Vol.1, p.142, L.16 - p.146, L.2),
the conviction cannot stand if there is a reasonable possibility that the prosecuting
attorney's improper comments influenced the result. See Garcia, 100 Idaho at 111.
The State responds, asserting that these statements should not automatically
be given their most damaging

interpretations.

(See

Resp.

Br.,

p.30

(citing

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 645 (1974).) The State is not wholly correct.

While the Supreme Court did state that "a court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor
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intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting
through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging
meanings," Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 647, that warning does not dissuade the courts from
giving the statements an objectively reasonable interpretation.
In the analogous situation of jury instruction, the courts apply the "reasonable
juror" standard when questions of error in the instruction arise.

See,

e.g.,

Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 514 (1979) ("whether a defendant has been

accorded his constitutional rights depends upon the way in which a reasonable juror
could have interpreted the instruction"); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315-16
(1985); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 (1987); see also Boyde v. California, 494
U.S. 370, 379-81 (1990) (noting that the Sandstrom standard had not been strictly
applied, but reaffirming that proper standard is "whether there is a reasonable likelihood
that the jury has applied the challenged instruction [improperly]").

In Sandstrom, the

United States Supreme Court held that "whether a defendant has been accorded his
constitutional rights depends upon the way in which a reasonable juror could have
interpreted the instruction." Id.; see also State v. Mubita, 145 Idaho 925, 942 (2008),
abrogated on other grounds by Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889,

896 (2011 ), (applying the Sandstrom "reasonable juror" standard).
However, the United States Supreme Court also recognized that the jurors could
have interpreted the instruction in a permissible manner, and as such, further
examination of the instruction given the potential reasonable interpretations was
necessary. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 519. It also rejected the government's assertion
that the fact that the instruction could have been interpreted properly meant no error
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occurred, stating "even if a jury could have ignored [the erroneous interpretation], we
cannot be certain that this is what they did do." Id. at 526 (emphasis in original); see
also Francis, 471 U.S. at 325 ("Because a reasonable juror could have understood the
challenged [instruction in an improper manner] and because the charge read as a whole
does not explain or cure the error, we hold that the jury charge does not comport with
the requirements of the Due Process Clause.") (emphasis added). As such, while the
courts will not presume that the jurors gave a statement its most damaging
interpretation, they will not ignore interpretations which a reasonable juror may have
given the statement.
The Idaho Supreme Court has applied basically the same standard in
prosecutorial misconduct cases: '"Where the issue of guilt is debatable or it appears
from the record that the jurors could have reasonably entertained doubt as to the
defendant's guilt and that misconduct of the prosecuting attorney might well have
influenced the result, a conviction will be reversed."' Garcia, 100 Idaho at 111 (quoting
Spencer, 74 Idaho at 184) (emphasis added).

Because that is the rule, misconduct

need not be express - it may be implied from the record. See, e.g., Beebe, 145 Idaho
at 576 ("Urgings, explicit or implied, for the jury to render a verdict based on factors
other than the evidence admitted at trial ... have no place in closing argument."). The
focus is on the effect the statements would have on the jury. Baruth, 107 Idaho at 657
("These statements had the effect-if not the intent-to disparage Baruth's attorney....
[W]e believe these statements were improper."). Therefore, if the result of a statement
is that there is a reasonable possibility that a reasonable juror could possibly have been
influenced to decide the case based on the erroneous comment, rather than on the
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evidence presented, the error is clear - such a comment constitutes misconduct. See

Perry, 150 Idaho at 226; Garcia, 100 Idaho at 111.

As such, the only question

remaining is whether the defendant is entitled to appellate relief (i.e., whether the
comments prejudiced the defendant). Baruth, 107 Idaho at 657. Therefore, if the most
damaging interpretation of a statement is a reasonable interpretation of that statement,
the courts cannot ignore the chance that the reasonable juror may have given the
statement its most damaging meaning.
Such a reasonable possibility exists in this case as a result of all the improper
comments by the prosecuting attorney.

Those comments, which addressed different

aspects of the case, basically told the jurors that they should believe the State's
evidence because the prosecutor is experienced and believes he presented good
evidence on behalf of the State, and it was the defense's responsibility to present
evidence disproving the State's evidence, but all the defense could do was present an
explanation which defense counsel knew was unbelievable, if not downright false.
As such, there is a reasonable possibility that this conglomeration of comments, in the
face of underwhelming evidence, did influence the verdict in this case. Therefore, the
accumulation of errors deprived Mr. Anderson of a fair trial, even if the individual
statements did not. As such, this Court should vacate Mr. Anderson's conviction. See

Perry, 150 Idaho at 226; Garcia, 100 Idaho at 111; Day, 2013 Opinion No.6, p.8.
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CONCLUSION
Based on these errors, Mr. Anderson respectfully requests that his conviction be
reversed, or alternatively, that his conviction be vacated and his case remanded for
further proceedings.
DATED this 24 th day of April, 2013.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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